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THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS.*
"By

ACCIDENT

ARISING

OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE

EMPLOYMENT"

It is now proposed to make a study of the cases dealing
with the phrase "by accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment." This phrase is taken from the English Act
of 1897 and was not given an application by the English courts
that was calculated to secure certainty to say the least. Most of
the American courts have copied it, although some of them have
omitted some part. For example, the Massachusetts act does
not contain the words "by accident."
Most of the cases considered in this study are rulings of
the compensation board and were not carried to the Court of
Appeals. All cases decided by the Court of Appeals on this
phrase have been considered, but their number is so few that
they are not sufficient to use for comparisons and conclusions.
The Kentucky act has not been in force long enough, considering that the state is not an industrial one, to enable one to find
very many cases that have been carried to the Court ofAppeals
upon any phase of the act. Rulings of the board, supplemented
by court holdings, when available, must be sufficient for our purpose.
"By

ACCIDENT"

Section 4880, Kentucky Statutes, fixes liability upon the
employer in applicable cases for personal injuries sustained
"by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or for death resulting from such accidental injury; provided, however, that personal injury by accident as herein defined shall not include disease, except where the disease is a
natural and direct result of traumatic injury by accident, nor
shall they include the results of a pre-existing disease."
By the word "accident" as employed in the above section
79
is meant something unusual, unexpected, and undesigned
*Whether the event is occasioned with or without negligence
does not affect the case.
*Earlier installments of this article are published in the November and January issues of the Kentucky Law Journal.
Grannisoes Admr. v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., 187 Ky. 538.
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An important question is raised by the words "injury by
accident" as used in Workmen's Compensation Acts. Shall
previously existing diseases affect the claimant's demand for
compensation? The general rule is that the employer takes the
employe subject to his physical condition and that if the employe can show that the injury was caused by an accident in the
course of the employment and arising out of the employment, he
can recover.
The Kentucky act has provided that personal injury by
accident shall not include the results of a pre-existing disease.
The board discussed that question in an early case.8 0 "Under
previous compensation acts .
.
there arose cases in which
an employe, prior to his injury, had contracted certain constitutional or chronic diseases, such as syphilis, diabetes, tuberculosis, etc.; on receiving a comparatively slight injury, and one
which a normal person would readily be recovered from, these
diseased employes would develop a prolonged disability, which
was from a practical standpoint chiefly due to their previously
diseased condition.
"The accidental injury would be the immediate, precipitating cause, but the disability would not have resulted but for the
pre-existing disease, it becoming customary to hold that such
cases were subject to compensation for the whole disability
which might result from the combined effects of the injury and
the disease, injustice resulted both to the employer in having to
pay excessive compensation for trivial injuries, and also to the
employes in subjecting them to occupational discrimination.
"Under this state of the law it became necessary for employers to protect themselves by refusing employment to diseased
persons, on account of the undue hazard of employing them.
The employe who had been so unfortunate as to contract one of
these diseases thereby suffered the added misfortune of being
placed at a distinct disadvantage in securing further employment in competition with other labor.
"To prevent the employers from being penalized for giving
work to this class of employes, and thereby afford them a more
equal chance of earning a living, the above-quoted provision of
the Kentucky act was adopted. It subjects the employer to a
uniform liability for the actual results of personal injuries
8Dee Jewett v. American Tobacco Co., 1 Ky. Leading Decisions 96.
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sustained in his employment, but provides that his liability shall
not include the results of a pre-existing disease."
The actual application of the provision is sometimes a
problem. In cases including both the results of an accidental
injury and the results of a pre-existing disease, the board must
determine how much is due to each. Here they exercise exactly
the same function as a jury in a trial at common law. They
must present a definite conclusion from a mass of more or less
indefinite evidence. In such a case personal opinion plays a
large share in the decision.
A far more difficult problem is presented in the case of
occupational diseases. Are they "injuries by accident" under
the act? They are not. Some acts provide compensation for
personal injuries and occupational diseases, but the only provision in the Kentucky act is for accidental injuries.
This has been worked out by giving a particular meaning
to the word "accident."
It must be traced to a deffiite time,
place and cause.
The case of Wiliam Simon v. Louisvile Ice & Cole Storage
Company will illustrate.8 1 William Simon was employed by
the Louisville Ice & Cold Storage Company as an ice puller.
Sores and boils developed on his legs, caused by calcium brine
dripping upon his trousers and shoes, and in that way coming
in contact with his flesh. The disability was not the result of
any particular application of the brine but due to the continued
applications during the course of his employment.
The board denied compensation, holding that the framers
of the act meant to limit compensation to accidents at some
definite time and place, resulting from some definite cause.
This seems to have been the intention of the legislators, if
one will consider the act. Section 4944 provides that the employer must keep a record of all injuries and report them to the
board within one week. Section 4914 provides that no proceeding for compensation shall be maintained unless the employe
shall have given notice to the employer as soon as practicable
after the accident. Section 4915 provides that such notice shall
state the time, place of occurrence and nature and cause of the
31William Simon v. Louisville Ice & Cond Storage Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 190; see Hamilton v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 4
Ky. Leading Decisions 147. (Leading Decisions of Kentucky Compensation Board are cited "Leading Decisions" in this paper.)
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accident. It would seem from a study of these sections that the
act contemplates an accident that is traceable to a definite time,
place and cause.
Of course, it is the problem of the legislature whether occupational diseases shall be included under the provisions of the
act. At first thought, it would seem that an injury which is the
result of a gradual growth should be just as deserving of compensation as one that can be traced to a definite time and place.
Both occurred in the course of the employment and are a direct
result of the employment.
But there are good grounds for the legislature desiring to
omit occupational diseases from the provisions of the Kentucky
act. The act provides that the employe must give notice to the
employer as "soon as practicable after the happening" of the
accident. This gives the employer an opportunity to investigate
the matter personally soon after its occurrence. Such immediate supervision, so necessary to prevent fraud or imposition, is
not possible if occupational diseases are included. Witnesses
are also much more easily obtainable if the accident can be limited to a definite date and they will better remember the acci82
dent if it can be traced to a definite time.
Thus, if occupational diseases are not included, the employer can find witnesses to whom the details of the accident
stand out vividly. If occupational diseases are included, it becomes more and more necessary to rely upon the testimony of
medical experts as to whether the injury was sustained out of
and in the course of the employment.
Every disease sustained while the employe was holding
down a job would be alleged to be sustained in the course of
employment, and a constant guard against fraud would have to
be maintained if proper protection were afforded the employer.
It would seem that the legislators were wise in omitting
occupational diseases from the provisions of the act.
Section 4880 provides that personal injury by accident does
not include diseases except where the disease is a natural and
direct result of traumatic injury by accident. It would seem
unfortunate that the word "traumatic" was used in the act.
IaA Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts,
Francis H. Bohlen. 25 Harvard Law Review 328.
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In the case of Pearl White v. Kentucky Collieries Corporation8 3 the board in discussing what would be a "traumatic injury," held as follows:
"In this case the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that
his disability is due to traumatic injury by accident.
"The Century Dictionary defines traumatic to be: 'An abnormal condition of the human body produced by external violence as distinguished from that produced by passions, symptomatic infections, bad habits, and other less evident causes.
Traumatism, an external wound as distinguished from one
caused by the surgical knife in an operation. 2. External violence producing bodily injury.'
"It will thus be seen that the instant case, where the claimant was injured by foul air and gases, does not come within the
definition of trauma, when the above definitions are considered,
and the Kentucky act prescribes that the disability must be due
to a traumatic injury by accident."
This question as to whether the injury is a "traumatic
injury" usually arises in Kentucky in a case where the injured
party has breathed foul air and gases in a mine.
Following the Pearl White case, decided February 1, 1921,
and quoted above, where compensation was denied, the board
reached a like decision in Jeff Kiser v. Marrowbone Mining Company, decided Dec. 20, 1921.84 But in Harris v. Render Coal
Company a different result was reached35
In that case the deceased was overcome by carbon monoxide
gas on July 30, 1918, and died August 1, 1918. The board found
as a finding of fact that his death was the result of accidental
injury, arising out of and in the course of his employment and
was not the result of a pre-existing disease. The deceased was
found in a state of collapse in the mine, overcome by the gas,
and showed all the symptoms of such poisoning. The board in
granting compensation said: "We think an employe may as
surely suffer an accident by being overcome with carbon monoxide gas as if he were struck by a piece of falling slate, and if
death results therefrom, under the provisions of the act, his de83Pearl White v. Kentucky Collieries Corp., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 66.
81Jeff Kiser v. Marrowbone Mining Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions
196.
17.
S Harris v. Render Coal Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions
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pendents would be entitled to receive compensation.
In the instant case there is no evidence thait decedent had
been affected by this gas previously, or that there had been a
slow and gradual process of absorption by him that culminated
so fatally. We believe the section of the act cited (section 4880)
under a fair and reasonable construction, giving to the words
their usual and ordinary meaning, covers an accident such as
befell Harris."
The -board in its decision of the Harris case distinguishes
that case from the Pearl White case by saying that "in the
Harris case, the accidental injury is traceable to a definite time,
place and cause, and the accidental injury suffered by decedent
and his subsequent death were in point of time contiguous and
one continuing event, while in the Pearl White case . . . the
claim was for disability caused by disease resulting from the injury received, and not for death resulting from accidental injury."
This distinction is poorly made. Of course the Harris case
was one of accidental death, while the Pearl White case was
one of disability not resulting in death. But both cases were
traceable to a definite time and place-the board in the Pearl
Vhite case finding as a fact that "Pearl White was injured on
the 12th day of July, 1919, while working in the mines of defendant, said injury being caused by the foul and impure air
and gases in the mine, and from which the claimant was disabled from work."
The only real difference in the two cases is that one resulted
in death and the other in disability. Does that make one of
them less entitled to compensation than the other? Whether
death or disability results, compensation, of course in comparative amounts, should be awarded.
Following the granting of compensation by the board in
the Harris case, the case of the Jellico Coal Company v. Adkins"0 came before the Court of Appeals and compensation was
denied. The case lays down the present law on the question in
Kentucky. In that case Morgan Adkins, while employed by the
Jellico Coal Company, became ill from the effects of bad air in
the defendant's mine, and discontinued his employment on
January 26, 1920. At the time of the action he was found by
Jellico CoaZ Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 972.
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the board to be suffering from inflammation of the lhing of
the heart. No other employe in the mine at the time that Adkins became ill suffered any ill effects from the conditions existing there.
The court held that the act implies from the use of the
words "traumatic injury" that "some external physical force
actually directed against the body must occur in order to constitute traumatic injury by accident." The board, the court
found, did not have jurisdiction to award compensation but
the plaintiff might have an action at law.
This decision places a narrow construction upon the word
"traumatic."
The impact of a germ upon the integrity of the
claimant's body, a blow which though microscopically minute,
produces an immediate effect, may well be held to be a "traumatic injury."
When one is injured by foul air and gases in a mine, some
external, physical force has actually been directed against the
body. Placing this construction upon the word, sudden, unexpected gas and foul air accidents would be within the jurisdiction of the board.
The claimant would still have to show that the injury occurred at some particular time and place. This would give
compensation for the sudden injury which seems just and would
continue to eliminate the so-called occupational disease claims,
where the foul air has affected the claimant through continued
exposure to it for some length of time.
It would seem better, though, to cut out the word altogether. Then the exception in the act would read, "Except
where the disease is the result of an injury by accident." We
have shown that a strict construction of the word leads to an unsatisfactory results. The same results that a broad construction
would give can be achieved with the word omitted.
By the construction of the courts a compensable accident
has been construed to mean one that can be traced to a definite
time, place and cause. Placing this construction on the word
"acident," sudden, unexpected foul air and gas injuries would
be compensable and those that were not iu this class but were
of the so-called occupational type would not be within the
board's jurisdiction. This gives the same result as a broad con-
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struction of the word "traumatic.'! Thus the act would be
more satisfactory with the word omitted.
"ARISING OUT OP AND IN THE COURSE OP THE EMPLOYMENT"
There are three requirements concerning the injury which
must be met by the Kentucky claimant for compensation:
(1) The injury must be sustained by accident.
(2) The accident must arise out of the employment.
(3) The accident must occur in the course of the employment.
Just as the court has placed a particular construction upon
the word "accident" as shown in our previous section, it has
raised a distinction between the terms "out of" and "in the
course of."
The words "arising out of" the employment as used in the
act, refer to the origin and cause of the accident, and the words
"in the course of" the employment, to the time, place and cir87
cumstances under which it occurred.
The words "out of" have been said to be descriptive of the
character or quality of the accident, the words "in the course
of" referring to the circumstances under which an accident of
that character or quality takes place.8 8
The words "out of" have given the board and courts great
difficulty; they are more difficult to apply to the various cases
than any other phrase. This is especially apparent in the socalled "assault cases."
The Kentucky 'Court of Appeals has held that the victim of
an assault is injured by accident as far as the injured party is
concerned. In Massachusetts the injury need not be sustained
by accident but it must be sustained in the course of the employment and arise out of it. Since the other requirement- are the
same in Massachusetts and Kentucky, the Kentucky board has
often referred to Massachusetts cases in assault decisions.
The Massachusetts decision most frequently referred to is
In Re McNicol.8 9 This case has been cited far and wide and
may be considered the leading case on assault. In that case an
employer permitted an employe to continue his work, although
"IHo~lenbach v. HoZlerubach, 64 supra.
mHonold on Workmen's Compensation, vol. 1, sec. 101.
1n Re McNico, 215 MAass. 497.
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the quarrelsome temperament and habitual drunkenness of the
employe were known to the employer. He finally attacked and
killed a fellow employe.
The court held that the injuries of the employe arose "out
of and in the course of the employment," saying: "It is sufficient to say that an injury is received in the course of the employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty
which he is employed to perform. It arises out of the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed
and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be
seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work, and to
have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with
the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment, then it arises out of the employment. "Y
The idea of the court seems to be that if there is danger and
the employer takes no action to abate it, he thereby makes this
additional hazard a part of the apparent dangers of the work to
which other employes are subjected.
Injuries resulting therefrom may therefore be considered
as arising out of the employment. The court limited the rule
by saying, "The case at bar is quite distinguishable from a stabbing by a drunken stranger, a felonious attack by a sober workman, or even rough sport or horseplay by companions who
might have been expected to be at work." '
It is possible to criticise the rule laid down in McNicol's case
and many have done so. What would be the test of a "rational
mind?" Any two individuals might decide differently. With
the changing personnel of compensation boards it would be very
difficult with such a loose criterion to anticipate a holding in
assault cases.
The writer is even more troubled in applying the words
"natural incident" to cases. Just when may an injury be considered to have followed as a "natural incident?" With such a
standard it is impossible to have certainty in compensation decisions.
But the rule in the McNicol case may be commended as
opening up an illuminating approach to the question in at least
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one respect. The rule states that there must be a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required
to be performed and the resulting injury. If the injury is the
proximate consequence of the employment, compensation should
be granted unless intervening circumstances divert the employer's liability.
The contemplation of a "reasonable man" is made the
standard for distinguishing whether the accident should have
been foreseen. The "reasonable man" standard has been satisfactory in other applications. Of course, when applied to juries,
one discovers that their findings are inclined to vary somewhat
with changing panels, but as applied to workmen's compensation boards a fairly constant result may be achieved. These
boards are composed of men wha may be termed experts, men
skilled in this type of work, who have become more and more
proficient by deciding numerous similar cases. Changes in the
personnel of the board need make little difference, because their
successors, with little exception, should be near the norm.
The injury may be said to arise "out of" the employment
when a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation
might have contemplated the accident as a possible incident
of the work and the injury is the proximate consequence of the
employment.
Rules, although not wholly reliable, may be an aid to boards
in arriving at their findings. On the other hand, boards should
be rather skeptical of rules and formulas. Indeed, the writer
is inclined to agree with the Kentucky board in its holding that
"In determination of whether an accidental injury 'arose out
of and in the 'course of' the employment, each case must depend upon its own circumstances and cannot be solved with
90
reference to any formula or principle."
The board is competent in the light of the individual training and experience of its members to settle each case upon its
merits. The less rules they have to hamper them, the more
easily will they be able to meet the purposes of the act. Taking
that as a general proposition, though certain rules and formulas
should be used when applicable, for in no other way can there
be uniformity and certainty in holdings by the board.
91Justice v. Tierney Mining Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 59.
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The board applied the rule in McNicol's case to Lindsay v.
Federal Coal Company.91 There the deceased was struck by a
fellow employe while upon the employer's premises waiting for
the hour of commencing work, the blow resulting in his death.
The two men had had words on the day previous to the accident
relative to the respective amount of coal that each was mining,
and the assailant complained that the deceased had been furnished more than his share of mine cars. There was evidence
that the deceased had threatened the assailant. No other motive
was apparent for the attack and prior to the fatal blow no words
were spoken, the assailant suddenly and without warning striking the deceased from behind. The employer had no notice of
the previous ill feeling.
The court in denying compensation comes dangerously close
to applying the fellow servant doctrine, which is expressly
abrogated by the act. Much stress is laid on the fact that the
employer knew nothing of the previous day's encounter so
should not be held liable for an assault of which he might have
had no premonition and which was not made to serve his interests.
But it should be no longer possible for the employer to escape liability by showing that he is free from negligence and by
forcing the injured employe to accept the fellow servant doctrine.
The board cited the rule and exceptions given in MeNicol's
case with approval and held that the death was due to personal
differences between the two men, and did not result from any
danger incidental to or induced by the employment.
It is admitted that this case points out a weakness in the
rule in MeNicol's case. Too much stress is laid upon the employer's knowledge of the assailant's previous acts. That is well
in some cases, but the employer is not to be excused by showing
that he was not negligent. The thing to look at in this type of
cases is not so much whether the employer was negligent, but
whether the employe received an injury arising out of the employment.
The other encounter between the two men had been on the
previous day. That affair was over. The attack on the day of
LinJdsay v. FeceraZ Coal Co., 1 Ky. Leading Decisions 107.
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the accident was a separate affair and not a part of the trouble
of the previous day. Of course it is for the board to determine
whether the accident is the result of a personal encounter between the two men. In such cases the courts are uniform in
holding that the accident does not arise out of the employment.
But where there were a few words the previous day and the next
day the deceased is struck down from behind, it would seem to
be apparent that it is difficult to connect the two occasions.
Rather it would seem that the jealousy of the assailant continued to grow because the deceased mined more coal than he
did. The very motive for the attack grew out of the employment. It is a question of fact whether private ill feeling between the men led to the. attack or whether it was a one-sided
encounter. If a one-sided encounter, it would seem that there
is good ground for holding the employer liable. The assault of
the jealous co-employe had its origin in the occupation in which
the parties were engaged.
Although the act has abrogated the fellow servant doctrine
and the necessity of the employe proving the negligence of the
employer, the boards and courts have so construed the phrase
"arising out of the employment" that the employer is unduly
protected.
Tos v. Norton Iron Warks92 will illustrate. The employe
was accidently shot by a drunken fellow employe, not on duty,
who had come upon the employer's property during the night.
The employe was asleep on the premises, during rest period,
for which he was paid wages.
The assailant had never shown
any indications of bad behavior, nor was he shown to have a
reputation for violence and disorder by his past conduct.
The board denied compensation. The board found that
"the great weight of authority is that, under acts requiring the
injury to have been sustained in the course of the employment
and also to have arisen out of it, there must, in assault cases,
be shown a causal connection between the resulting injury and
some pre-existing incident or condition of the employment of such proximity that the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances in advance of the incident, might
reasonably anticipate its occurrence." This is a restatement of
9'Tosh v. Norton Iron Works, 2 Ky. Leading Decisions 9.
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the rule in McNicol's case. The iule is broad enough to hold the
employer liable in this case if given a liberal construction.
This injury had its origin in the employment. The employer might reasonably have anticipated that some drunken
person would enter his premises and, eluding the guard, commit
such an act. Here the board again puts the decision upon the
fact that the employer had not been negligent and that he could
not reasonably have anticipated the attack from any pre-existing
incident or condition of the employment. This narrow interpretation by the courts generally of the phrase "arising out of the
employment" shows the continued tendency to protect the employer at the expense of the employe, although the spirit of the
act is clearly against it and the act need not be interpreted to
do so. It seems to be a sort of hold-over from the protection of
the employer which was accorded by the common law.
The board may well ask two questions in assault cases:
(1) Was the assault upon the injured or deceased employe induced by the discharge of his duties as an employe of
the defendant q
(2) Or was the attack the result of personal or private
differences between the employe and his assailant?
These are ea~ie r to apply to the facts of a particular case
than is the rule in McNicol's case. Thus, where an employe was
shot at the noon hour, while at his own home by a fellow employe and it was impossible, although there was some evidence
to the contrary, to show a causal connection between the shooting and the employment, compensation was not allowed. 3 The
case comes under the second question-the assault was the result of private differences between the two men.
In Walther v. Wood Mosaic Company"4 the deceased had
pursued a course of hostility toward his fellow employe, abusing him because he was an ex-soldier. At the time of the assault the deceased cursed the assailant about putting or placing
lumber on a wagon, which they were loading in the course of
their employment. The board found that this was not done to
further the business of the employer and denied compensation
on the ground that it was the result of personal differences between the two men. The holding seems to be correct, but the
"JilarZ v. Acme By-Product Co., 4 Ky.- Leading Decisions 219.
Walther v. Wood Mosaic Co., 2 Ky. Leading Decisions 62.
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language of the board is highly colored by war-time feeling.
This sentence is in the memoranda of the board, "It is likely
that Forgy's killing of Walther prevented someone else from
killing him later, if he had persisted in his disloyal utterances."
Such a sentence has little place in the opinion of a body as dignified and dispassionate as a compensation board should be.
There are better remedies for disloyal citizens than permitting
private individuals to strike them down.
It is found that the Kentucky board is in accord with the
majority in its decisions in assault cases. In cases, though,
where the co-cmploye had not previously shown a disposition
to be ill-behaved, it would seem, as has been said, that the boards
and courts have thrown around the employer too much protection and re-erected the barrier of the fellow servant doctrine
against the employe. A very narrow construction of the phrase
"arising out of the employment" is apparent also in cases of
attacks by a drunken trespasser or a stranger.
While applying the phrase closely in assault cases, the board
is more liberal in the case of horseplay. Where the injured employe took no part in the fun-making, it is generally held that
the accident arose out of the employment.
In Phillips v. Louisville Cooperage Company9 5 the employe
lost the sight of his right eye as the result of being hit by a
stave thrown by a'fellow employe, who was indulging in horseplay. The claimant was not engaged in or responsible for the
sportive act which caused his injury.
The board granted compensation, quoting from Hulley v.
Moosbrugger: "It appears that the prosecutor employed young
men and boys. It is but natural to expect them to deport themselves as young men and boys, replete with the activities of life
and health. For workmen of that age, or even of mature age, to
indulge in a moment's diversion from work to joke with or play
a prank upon a fellow workman is a matter of common knowledge to any one who employs labor.
"At any rate, it cannot be said that the attack upon decedent was so disconnected from decedent's employment as to take
it out of the class of risks reasonably incident to the employment
of labor. At common law the master was not liable for an injury to his servant caused by the negligent act of a fellow serw Phillips v. Louisville Cooperage Co., 3 Ky. Leading Decisions 42.
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vant, upon the ground that the servant assumed the risk. Under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the master assumes all risks
reasonably incident to the employment.'' 96
This is the proper result. But why should not the same rule
apply in the case of assult by a drunken co-employe? There
the court makes the decision rest upon notice to the employer of
previous irregularities in the conduct of the attacking employe.
It is submitted that the act should be given the same literal
construction in assault cases that is apparent in horesplay cases.
Where the employe is injured through some sportive act of
his own, the rule is that the accident does not "arise out of the
employment," although it may arise "in the course of" it.0 7
Where the employe incurs added risks which carries him
beyond the scope of his employment, the employer is not generally liable. If the employer has divided his work into certain
spheres and one employe steps out of his class and attempts to
do work for which he is not fitted and for which he was not
hired, he should be unable to recover compensation for any injuries that he may receive. 9 3 The employer has the right to
manage his business as he chooses and should be able to limit his
liability to the employe to the orbit in which he has placed him.
The rule is subject to certain exceptions. The employe
may recover compensation for injuries received outside the
immediate scope of his employment if he has varied its orbit
because of an emergency. He is also allowed some latitude
for the exercise of his own judgment as to when and how he can
best serve the interests of his employer. As Mr. Bohlen says,
"Compensation is for good servants who remain where they are
put, or who only stray therefrom when they can more effectively
serve their master by so doing."
In Kraher v. Afred Struck Vompany, 9 9 while the operator
of a sanding machine was temporarily absent from the front of
the machine, the claimant who was working at the rear end of
the machine went to the front to shut off the roller and his
hand was crushed. The claimant had been verbally warned to
stay away from the front of the machine but boys frequently
played with it. The sandpaper was so badly worn that the
"Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 87 N. J. L. 103.
,PTMeaderv. Hilman Ehrmain Co., 1 Ky. Leading Decisions 45.
See 82, supra.
RKraher v. Alfred Struck Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 135.
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machine needed to be stopped to prevent the paper from tearing.
The fact that the emloye violated the instructions of his
employer in going to the front of the machine and attempting
to stop it did not prevent him from receiving compensation, although it was cut down 15% for violation of the instructions
of his employer, as provided by the act.
The board carefully distinguishes between wilful misconduct and negligence. "What is wilful misconduct is necessarily
a mixed question of law and facts. Like 'reasonable care,'
'gross negligence,' and similar terms, it is not susceptible of
being abstractly defined in terms which would with uniform
certainty fix a line of demarcation between what would be wilful misconduct and what would not, in advance of the particular
act upon which it is to be predicated. It will always be necessary, in passing upon each case, to take into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case as it may arise, along
with such fixed rules of construction as it may be practicable
to establish in advance. It may be said, however, that 'wilful
misconduct' is to be clearly distinguished from the 'contributory negligence' which is a defense at common law. It is not
enough that the employe may have been negligent, even to the
extent that the injury is caused solely by his own negligence.
Wilful misconduct implies positive wrongdoing, rather than
negligence.' 0 0
Here the employe was within the area of his duty when injured. He was injured on the machine at which he worked.
Although ordered to keep away from the front of the machine,
he had seen other boys playing there. When the paper became
loose, he did the natural thing-tried to stop the machine.
There can be no doubt that he violated his instructions or that
the act was negligent, but he was within the ambit of his employment and was serving his employer as he thought best. That
distinguishes the case from one of wilful misconduct.
In Graves v. Henderson Telephone & Telegraph Corpary10 1 dynamite caps were left in a building by members of a
construction crew. The plaintiff, who was in charge of the
101Gates v. Cottonseed, Products Co., 1 Ky. Leading Decisions 147.
"'Graves v. Henderson Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1 Ky. Leading
Decisions 126.
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building, discovered them in the basement. While examining
one to discover what it was, he was injured by its exploding in
his hand.
The board granted compensation, holding that the plaintiff
was in the course of his duty at the time of the accident and was
endeavoring to serve his master's interests.
"An employe must be reasonably allowed some latitude
for the exercise of his own judgment as to when and how he
can best serve the interests of his employer. When these requisite conditions exist and the injury results from a special risk
incident to the employment, and there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed, the injury arises out of the employment even when the
connection is somewhat remote, and when the direct and immediate agency is foreign."
Two cases of incurring added risk are distinguished by the
board. In one the employe is sent upon an errand or is engaged
in a task which takes him to the street and he rides upon a conveyance belonging to his employer in order to make better time,
although he has no instructions to do so. In the other case he
rides upon a conveyance belonging to a stranger.
Justice v. Tierney Mining Company1 ° 2 will illustrate the
first class. The plaintiff was in the employment of the defendant as a helper on a coal-cutting machine and was sent by the
person in charge of the machine from the mine to telephone the
electrician to come and repair the machine they were using.
He rode on a mine motor. While en route and before he
reached the power house, he let his right hand drop to his side
and it was caught in the revolving cogs of the motor and mangled. It was against the published rules of the company for' any
employe except the motorman and brakeman to ride on the
motor. Compensation was granted.
Pilher v. Progress Chair Company1 3 will illustrate the
second class. There the plaintiff's duties required him to take
bills of lading to. a point one block distant. He requested permission to ride upon a truck belonging to a stranger, who had no
connection with his employer's business. On attempting to
v. Tierney Mining Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 59.
.T
justice
103Pilcher v. Progress Chair Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 180.
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alight from the truck at his destination, he was run over by it
and injured. Compensation was denied.
In each of these cases the employe was beyond the scope of
his employment. The only real distinguishing feature is that
in the case where compensation was granted, the plaintiff was
filching a ride upon a conveyance belonging to his employer,
while in the case where compensation was denied, the conveyance belonged to a stranger.
But why should this distinction be made ? Is there any real
difference in the two cases? If one has an express sphere of
duty and in violation of published rules chooses to go outside
the scope of his employment in order to accelerate the accomplishment of that duty, he is not entitled to compensation. The
right to ride upon the motor is as poorly founded as the right
of the other employe to ride upon the truck. The workman
may forfeit his right to compensation by choosing an unnecessarily dangerous method of doing the work. Thus, if he selects
an improper method of work for some private purpose of his
own, he absolves his employer from liability in case of injury.
In McDaniel v. Ashland Iron & Mining Company the deceased was working for the defendant with the dolomite
gang.30 4 His duty was to aid in lowering barrels of dolomite
from an upper floor to the ground below. After bringing a
barrel of dolomite from the upper floor, he took hold of the rope
used for lowering the barrels to ascend to the upper floor again,
instead of using the stairway.
The stairway had been provided by the defendant for the
use of the employes and was near the pit where the accident occurred. The deceased had ascended by the rope just previous to
his death, although he had been warned not to do so, and the operator of the crane had rules posted in the crane cabin which
prohibited employes from riding on the crane.
The board after some uncertainty granted compensation,
subject to the 15% penalty for violation of rules, making an
attempt to give the act a liberal construction to effectuate the
beneficent purposes for which it was passed.
The board in the course of its memoranda said, "CA distinction must be made between the doing of a thing recklessly
104
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and the doing of a thing altogether
or negligently
outside and unconnected with his employment. A peril which
arises from the negligent or careless manner in which an employe does the work he is employed to do may well be held to be
a risk incidental to the employment." The board decided that
the act of the employe was one of negligence and did not
amount to wilful misconduct.
As stated, the board was hesitant in granting compensation.
One is disposed to be as hesitant in accepting the ruling. If the
workman has made an error of judgment or honestly believes
that he is doing that which will further his employer's interests,
he is entitled to compensation. But here the employe was
merely seeking to save himself exertion. He was serving a purpose of his own, outside the course of his employment. His
employer had gone so far as to expressly forbid him to do the
act which resulted in the injury. He exposed himself to new
risks which were outside the reasonable contemplation of the
parties when they made the contract of employment. They
were not incident to his employment and were not entered into
in an effort to further his master's interests.
This was more than negligence. It was a headstrong exercise of the employe's own will against the express orders of his
employer-an intentional effort to serve his own inclinations.
A danger which was not connected with the employment was
He is in no
voluntarily, even stubbornly, sought by him.
position to demand a liberal construction of the "wilful misconduct" clause.
A difficult question arises when an employe volunteers to
go beyond the scope of his own immediate employment to help
another employe.
In Foreman v. Lexington Utilities Compaljy0 5 the deceased was a "trouble man" for the utilities company and his
duties were to repair electric lights in residences. He was ordered to remedy certain light trouble peculiarly incident to and
connected with his general duties. By mutual agreement he and
another employe rode together in an automobile belonging to the
company to the scene of certain are light trouble, which the
other employe had been ordered to fix. They evidently planned
to aid each other in accomplishing their separate duties.

0 Foreman v.

Lexington Utilities Co., 3 Ky. Leading Decisions 157.
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There was a custom known to and sanctioned by the employer for employes to assist each other in cases of emergency
and the deceased had assisted in the repair of are lights at various times and places, although the policy of the company was to
circumscribe the duties of its employes in the various departments. While fixing the are light, the deceased was struck by
an automobile and so seriously injured that he died.
The company contended that he was a "volunteer and
acting outside his employment and duties," but the board
granted compensation. He had momentarily stepped from the
performance of his duties in pursuance of a custom known to
and sanctioned by his employer in an honest attempt to further
the employer's business.
This rule should be applied in few cases. It should be the
privilege of the employer to limit the ambit of his employes'
activities. Here, though, it was found that the two employes
could be of mutual assistance by combining their duties, and it
seems a helpful intervention upon the part of the deceased in
the conduct of his master's business.
The decision should be placed squarely upon an honest attempt to further the master's business to distinguish the case
from one where the employe would have become a volunteer in
order to gain the companionship of the other employe in the
performance of their duties or to gain a ride in the company's
automobile in order to save himself the exertion of walking.
As a general rule the employe who is injured in going to
or returning from work is unable to get compensation. His
risks are of the commonalty for they are not incident to his
particular employment.
In Nieman v. Feldman Milk & Cream Company'"° an employe was walking from his home to report for work and slipped
upon the icy sidewalk. The board held that he was not yet in
the course of his employment and denied compensation.
The risk of commonalty doctrine received a very narrow
interpretation in Danner v. Aniroit & Son.10 7 In that case the
claimant was engaged in cranking a Vim truck next to the sidewalk at the automobile entrance to the place of business of the
'O Nieman v. Feldman Milk & Cream Co., 2 Ky. Leading Decisions 32.
"'Danner v. Androit & Son, 2 Kentucky Leading Decisions 116.
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defendant where he was employed as an automobile mechanic.
While cranking the machine, he was shot in the leg by a member of the police department who had aimed at a colored man
who was running away from a crap game. The board did not
give compensation, laying down the same rule as that applied
in assault cases. This rule has been criticised elsewhere in this
paper. The board found that the accident did not result from
any danger incidental to or induced by the employe's discharge
of his duties.' It was a random shot which any one on the street
might have received.
Although this was not an accident "naturally" incident to
the employment, it was one which might reasonably have been
contemplated by the parties: Any one whose duties force him to
be upon the street is exposed to innumerable accidents. The
fact that he needs only to go out into the street in front of a
garage lessens his chances of meeting one of these accidents but
does not change the fact that the accident, if it occurs, arises
out of his employment.
. It is not sufficient for the employer to say that he was subject to no greater risk than the other persons on the street at the
time. Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, vol. 1, page 424,
says: "A clerk cutting his finger while sharpening his pencil in
the course of his employment is entitled to compensation if the
injury proves serious, notwithstanding the fact that his danger
is no greater than that of any person carrying a pocketknife,
whether employed or not." The doctrine of risk of commonalty
must, therefore, be confined to cases where the risk is not naturally incident to the employment.
A more satisfactory holding was given by the board in
Brown v. Adams Company, decided a year later. 0 8 There the
decedent at the time of his death was engaged in collecting for
the defendant, was walking, and was struck by an automobile
while attempting to cross the street. Accounts which he had in
his possession for collection were found scattered in the street.
The duties of the decedent required that he visit various parts of
Louisville, to collect accounts due his employer, including the
vicinity where he was killed.
Compensation was granted. The servant was in the course
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of his master's business when the accident occurred. The fact
that others were exposed to a like danger had nothing to do with
whether it arose out of his employment.
This type of case should be distinguished from the case
where a workman is injured by. a street accident while going to
or coming from work. The very nature of his employment had
subjected him to this additional risk. The employer's liability
was not relieved because others in the vicinity were subjected
to a like danger. His duties on the street kept him more exposed to these hazards than the ordinary member of the public.
"Where the particular risk is involved in the particular thing
which the workman is required to do, an accident caused by
such particular risk arises out of the employment."
There is a class of cases decided by the board which may be
termed "leisure time" cases. The fact that an employe is injured during a lull in his employment does not defeat his right
to compensation. The phrase "in the course of the employment" is not limited to the time during which the servant is
engaged in doing the work for which he is engaged. He must
necessarily have periods during which he may rest or attend to
calls of nature.
It is not necessary that he be paid for the time during
which the accident occurs. The fact that he is drawing wages
by the hour or that they are suspended during the noon hour, or
even in some cases while he sleeps will not affect his recovery,
if the accident is "in the course of his employment."
An employe who accidentally overturns a pot of tea and
scalds herself in a lunch room provided by the employer comes
within the rule that "leisure time" accidents are compensable.
"Quenching thirst, relieving hunger, answering calls of nature,
the performances of which, while at work, being reasonably
necessary to health and comfort, are incidents of ordinary employments, and if one be injured, while thus engaged, the accident arises 'out of and in the course of the employment.' "109
There are limitations to the rule
if the employe is upon the master's
where he is permitted to be and is not
bidden act, the accident comes within

and exceptions arise, but
premises and at a place
doing an unlawful or forthe provisions of the act.

19 Clare v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 2 Ky. Leading Decisions 29.
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If the employe leaves his employer's premises for lunch, he is
within the exceptions to the rule. The "place" where the accident occurs is an important factor in determining whether he
can demand compensation.
The liability of the employer continues while the employe
is washing up and changing clothes preparatory to going home.
In Barres v. Watterson Hotel Company a maid employed in a
hotel had finished her duties, changed her clothes, put on street
attire, and entered an elevator operated by the hotel for carrying its employes, etc., in order to get to the street to go home.
She was injured. The Court of Appeals held that her employment was not in abeyance and that she could not recover in a
suit at law against the hotel company for its negligence, for such
injury comes within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.110
In Penicks v. Hull Company"' an employe of the defendant
was seeking to locate a car load of coal in a railroad yard and
stepped behind two cars in a cut of four standing detached on a
siding, for the purpose of attending to a call of nature. While
the decedent was between the cars, an engie hicked two other
cars upon the track where the cars were standing and decedent
was fatally injured. The board held that he was entitled to
compensation but denied it upon another point. He was engaged in his master's business at the time of the accident and at
a place where he was ordered to go. Although he had stopped
to answer a call of nature he was not engaged in an unlawful
act.
This case shows a clear distinction between wilful misconduct and negligence. The defendant had contended that the decedent by "the use of his eyes or by the slightest inquiry" could
have discovered toilet facilities. He was very likely negligent
in selecting a place but negligence alone will not deprive him
of the benefits of the act. If toilet facilities had been in plain
view and he had wilfully and stubbornly chosen to go between
the cars, he should have been denied compensation. That would
have created a situation comparable to the ease of McDaniel v.
Ashland Iron & Mining Company, which has been criticised in
this paper. That was a case of a stubborn exercise of an em"°Barresv. Watterson Hotel Co., 196 Ky. 101.
2' Penicks v. HaN Co., 2 Ky. Leading Decisions 67.

Wo Km N s Co

PF sATIoN ACTS

ploye's will to serve his own interests. This is a case of an employe, pressed by an urgent call of nature, negligently selecting
a dangerous place, when at the time it appeared to him to be
safe.
An oil pumper slept in a room upon the premises of his.
employer so that he would be available for work at all hours,
his duties as a pumper being continuous during the entire twenty-four hours of the day. While he was sleeping, he was fatally
injured by a gas explosion in the room he occupied. The board
granted compensation, holding that he was on duty at all times
and consequently the relation of master and servant existed
between him and his employer at the time the injury occurred." 2 His employment required him to occupy sleeping
and living quarters furnished by the employer, so that he could
be subject to duty at all times. A different result would arise
if the employe were living on the master's premises for his own
convenience.
Where an employe leaves his place of employment during
working hours for the purpose of smoking and is injured, the
accident does not arise out of the employment. 1" 3 Although
the act of ministration needs to be only indirectly conducive to
the purpose of the employment, it must be in some way necessary to the better performance of it and not as a mere gratification of the employe's personal desires.
CONOcLUSIOI
Cases applying the phrase "by accident arising out of and
in the course of" the employment have been examined in detail.
They have shown the tendency of the board and courts to give
to each of the essential words a well defined meaning. This has
resulted in some types of cases in a uniformity and certainty of
decision that is very satisfactory. In other cases a technical significance has been given to certain words that has thwarted the
purpose of the act and given to the employer a protection almost
equal to that given to him by the common law.
The phrase has been much criticised and there was some
doubt whether it should be incorporated in the American acts.
10 Curtis v. Dominion OiZ Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions 114.
"2"urphy
v. Sobel-Marx Co., 4 Ky. Leading Decisions.
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The writer, after a study of the cases, is not so much inclined to
criticise the phrase itself as he is the application of it.
It is doubtful if any alternative phraseology would be
more pleasing in result. The literary construction of the phrase
is simple and no elements are introduced by it that are not essential to a recovery of compensation.
It has been suggested that the words "by accident" have
led to such an unsatisfactory result in the cases of occupational
diseases that they should be omitted, as they are in the Massachusetts act. It was, of course, a problem whether to include
occupational diseases under the act. The writer is inclined to
agree with the evident intention of the legislature to refuse to
grant compensation in such cases because of the difficulty of
proof and the consequent danger of fraud and imposition.
The introduction of the word "traumatic" into the act has
not had a happy result. It is possible to give a broad construction to the word and thus achieve the desired result, but
the board and courts have refused to do so. The act should be
amended and the word taken out.
The words "out of" emphasize the element of causal connection with the employment. This is a requisite element in
every case and the board and courts have reached pleasing results generally in the application of it, except in assault cases,
where an attempt has been made to preserve the defenses of the
fellow servant rule and the necessity of proof of the master's
negligence to the employe. This is not the result of any inherent
meaning in the words themselves but merely indicates the slowness of the courts to realize that the common law defenses are
abrogated by the act.
The purpose of the act would not be achieved by substituting a body of complete and precise rules for the phrase. No
body of rules could cover the facts of every case and such a formulation would only tend to hinder the board in its administration of the act.
The solution is not so much in the matter of mere draftsmanship of a phrase. It is rather in the vision with which it is
interpreted by the board and courts.
RoY MOR
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